Chapter 20 Notes: Phenotypic Evolution: Figure WN20.7 - The expected payoff for different kinds of contests in the hawk–dove game, when the resident population is at the evolutionarily stable strategy (ESS) (P = 0.5,

Figure WN20.7 - The expected payoff for different kinds of contests in the hawk–dove game, when the resident population is at the evolutionarily stable strategy (ESS) (P = 0.5,

Figure WN20.7. The expected payoff for different kinds of contests in the hawk–dove game, when the resident population is at the evolutionarily stable strategy (ESS) (P = 0.5, where P is the probability that an individual plays hawk rather than dove). The payoff matrix is given in Box 20.4c.

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